




Director of  
Central Intelligence

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# National Intelligence Daily

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
Briefs and Comments

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
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The Overnight Reports, printed on yellow paper as the final section of the *Daily*, will often contain materials that update the Situation Reports and Briefs and Comments.



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



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USSR-FRANCE: Results of Brezhnev-Giscard Talks

*The talks between Presidents Brezhnev and Giscard in Moscow last week outlined the major features of current Soviet foreign policy, particularly the USSR's continuing preoccupation with China and its opposition to the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. The Soviets stressed the importance of disarmament and detente and avoided contentious bilateral issues. Brezhnev's lack of stamina was evident in his talks with Giscard.*


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China, as expected, figured prominently in private discussions between the two leaders. Brezhnev warned Giscard that France would be working against detente if it sold arms to China; he "scolded" the French for transferring nuclear technology to the Chinese. The Soviet President also said France would be setting a poor example for China if it maintained its refusal to participate in SALT III.

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
The Middle East came up in a dinner toast by Brezhnev in which he condemned the Egyptian-Israeli treaty as a "separate deal" with an anti-Arab character. Gromyko, commenting in private, was more blunt, stating at one point that nothing is possible in the Middle East until the treaty is abrogated. Africa came in for little attention in the talks, as did human rights.

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The most notable document to come out of the talks was the "Program for the Further Development of Cooperation," which calls for regular meetings "at the highest level"--going beyond the 1970 protocol establishing semi-annual meetings of the foreign ministers--and the encouragement of working-level contacts between the two governments to promote closer political cooperation.

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
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#### OVERNIGHT REPORTS


(The items in the Overnight Reports section have not been coordinated within the intelligence community. They are prepared overnight by the Office of Current Operations with analyst comment where possible from the production offices of NFAC.)

#### Japan-Egypt

Commenting on recent cables from US Embassies in Cairo and Kuwait on Japanese-Egyptian relations, the US Embassy in Tokyo reported yesterday that the ranking Foreign Ministry official on the Middle Eastern desk has privately expressed confidence that some modest, additional aid to Egypt would be provided by his government "in due course." The Japanese do not want to damage relations with Arab states who produce much of their oil, and hope to avoid giving the impression that additional aid for Egypt has resulted from US pressure or is clearly a part of a US initiative or program; those were factors in requesting a delay in President Sadat's planned visit to Japan in July. The Embassy noted that Japan fully supports the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and will subscribe to positive comments in that regard in the communique marking Prime Minister Ohira's talks with President Carter beginning today.



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


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Panama-US

On the eve of President Royo's meeting with President Carter next week, the US Embassy in Panama City reports that the Panamanian Government is troubled by "hostile" US Congressional activity, depressing economic reports and serious unemployment, and the revival of political activity and attendant criticism of government policies. The Embassy notes that the 37-year-old Royo must appear independent of, though retain a special relationship with, General Torrijos, his political mentor. Royo's recent, well-publicized "complaint" to President Carter was intended to sound assertive for domestic consumption, but the Embassy believes Royo desires to avoid jeopardizing favorable Congressional action on implementing the Canal treaties. [REDACTED]

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Rhodesia

US Ambassador to Zambia Low yesterday offered his analysis of the public unpleasantness between Bishop Muzorewa and James Chikerema, the vice president of Muzorewa's United African National Congress, which will have 51 of the 100 seats in the new parliament of Zimbabwe Rhodesia. Chikerema is certain to challenge the Bishop at some point and--with one more representative of the UANC--could combine with supporters of Reverend Sithole, Chief Ndeweni, and Ian Smith to deny Muzorewa the prime ministership or later thwart his legislative initiatives. The effect of the Chikerema challenge, Ambassador Low suggests, is to make the 28 white seats a swing element in the new parliament with more leverage to reduce the prospect of significant changes in the new constitution.

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Colombia-US

A bomb, which detonated last night at the residence of Marine guards for the US Embassy in Bogota, slightly injured seven Marines and two guests; damage to the residence was extensive, according to the Embassy. The Maoist Popular Liberation Army has claimed credit for the bombing.


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